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Abstract
If mutually mistrustful parties A and B control two or more appropriately located sites, special
relativity can be used to guarantee that a pair of messages exchanged by A and B are independent.
In earlier work, we used this fact to define a relativistic bit commitment protocol, RBC1, in which
security is maintained by exchanging a sequence of messages whose transmission rate increases
exponentially in time. We define here a new relativistic protocol, RBC2, which requires only a
constant transmission rate and could be practically implemented. We prove that RBC2 allows
a bit commitment to be indefinitely maintained with unconditional security against all classical
attacks. We examine its security against quantum attacks, and show that it is immune from the
class of attacks shown by Mayers and Lo-Chau to render non-relativistic quantum bit commitment
protocols insecure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of quantum cryptography was opened up by Wiesner’s early investigation [21]
of the application of quantum information to cryptography, and the ensuing discoveries by
Bennett and Brassard of secure quantum key distribution [1] and by Ekert of entanglement-
based quantum key distribution [5]. Quantum cryptography is now a flourishing area of
theoretical research. Its successes raise a broader theoretical question: it would be very
interesting to know precisely which cryptographic tasks, other than key distribution, can be
implemented in such a way that their security is guaranteed by physical principles, without
any additional computational assumptions. An important first step would be to establish
precisely which physical principles can guarantee cryptographic security in some serious
application.
This paper focusses on one task, bit commitment, and one physical principle, the impos-
sibility of superluminal signalling: that is, of sending signals faster than light speed. We
begin by briefly explaining both.
Roughly speaking — precise definitions are given in the next section — bit commitment
is the cryptographic version of a securely sealed envelope. In the commitment phase of a bit
commitment protocol, Alice supplies Bob with data that commit her to the value of a bit,
without allowing Bob to infer that value. In the unveiling phase, which takes place after
commitment, if and when Alice wishes, she supplies Bob with further data that reveal the
value of the bit to which she was committed. We are particularly interested in protocols
which are unconditionally secure, in the sense that the laws of physics imply that neither
party can cheat, regardless of the technology or computing power available to them.
The impossibility of faster than light signalling is guaranteed if the standard understand-
ing of causality within Einstein’s special theory of relativity is correct. To characterise its
cryptographic relevance requires a little more discussion: readers without a background in
physics may wish to skip the technical details in the remainder of this paragraph, which are
not needed to understand the main part of the paper. We assume that physics takes place in
flat Minkowski spacetime, with the Minkowski causal structure. This is not exactly correct,
of course: according to general relativity and to experiment, spacetime is curved. But it is
true to a good enough approximation for any protocol implemented on or near Earth. In
principle, the timing constraints of our protocol should take into account the error in the
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approximation. Other than this, the known corrections arising from general relativity do
not affect our security discussion. Discussion of the hypothetical cryptographic relevance of
other more exotic and speculative general relativistic phenomena can be found in Ref. [6].
Nothing in science is beyond doubt, but it seems fair to say that the impossibility of su-
perluminal signalling provides as solid a foundation for a security argument as a cryptologist
could wish for. It would take a major scientific revolution for our protocols to be revealed
as insecure because special or general relativity turned out be incorrect — just as it would
for quantum key distribution or other quantum cryptography protocols to be revealed as
insecure because quantum theory proved to be incorrect. (That said, it should be added
that at the time of writing the parallel between the two cases is not perfect: some quantum
key distribution protocols have been proven secure against eavesdroppers equipped with ar-
bitrarily powerful quantum computers, while we have not so far been able to prove that our
bit commitment protocols are secure against general quantum attack.)
The recent history of work on secure physical implementations of bit commitment is com-
plex and interesting. Initially, attention was focussed entirely on non-relativistic quantum
protocols. Bennett and Brassard [1] described a simple quantum bit commitment protocol
which is secure against both parties given current technology; they also pointed out that
it would be insecure against a committer who is able to make and store entangled singlet
states. Some time later, Brassard, Cre´peau, Jozsa and Langlois (BCJL) [3] produced a
quantum bit commitment protocol which, at the time, they claimed to have proved to be
unconditionally secure against attacks by either party.
The subject was then transformed by the remarkable and celebrated insights of Mayers
and Lo-Chau. A detailed history would need to consider unpublished work and also earlier
papers that were circulated or temporarily archived (e.g. [12]). Those who actively par-
ticipated in these developments are best placed to supply such a history, and Mayers’ and
Lo-Chau’s accounts can be found in the references cited below. Not having been an active
participant, I here discuss only Mayers’ and Lo-Chau’s published or permanently archived
papers.
Lo and Chau [10, 11] pointed out the existence of an inherently quantum cheating strategy
which implies that quantum bit commitment protocols that are perfectly secure against
Bob are completely insecure against Alice. Essentially the same point was made by Mayers
[13, 14, 15] at around the same time. Mayers showed further that the essential intuition
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underlying this strategy can be extended to imply that, for a large class of quantum schemes,
not only is perfect security against both Alice and Bob impossible, but security in the usual
cryptographic sense — in which non-zero cheating probabilities are tolerated provided that
they can be made arbitrarily small by adjusting a security paramater — is also impossible.
In particular, as Lo and Chau argued [11] and Mayers rigorously proved [13], the BCJL
protocol is insecure.
Mayers [15] briefly discussed the possibility of using relativistic signalling constraints for
bit commitment, and suggested that his version of the no-go theorem should also apply
to relativistic protocols. Brassard, Cre´peau, Mayers and Salvail (BCMS) [4] subsequently
examined one possible strategy for bit commitment based on temporary relativistic signalling
constraints, based on an earlier protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Widgerson
(BGKW) [2], and showed that it was indeed insecure against quantum attacks.
In fact, though, relativistic protocols can evade the Mayers and Lo-Chau no-go theorems
[6]. Ref. [6] describes a relativistic bit commitment protocol which iteratively combines
BGKW’s bit commitment technique with relativistic signalling constraints. The protocol
does not belong to the classes considered by Mayers and Lo-Chau, and their no-go results do
not apply: in particular, the model is demonstrably not vulnerable to the Mayers-Lo-Chau
cheating strategy. It allows bit commitments to be maintained indefinitely, and is conjec-
tured to be unconditionally secure against both classical and quantum attacks. However, it
has a serious practical weakness, as it requires the communication rates between the parties
to increase exponentially in time in order to sustain the commitment [6].
The main point of this paper is to describe a new relativistic protocol which allows a
committer and recipient, who each control more than one suitably located separated site,
to sustain a bit commitment indefinitely. The protocol requires only a constant rate of
communication between the parties. The communications need to be continued indefinitely
to maintain the commitment. It is shown that the protocol is unconditionally secure against
all classical attacks by either party. I conjecture that it is also unconditionally secure against
all quantum attacks.
This represents theoretical progress, and also opens up new possibilities for practical
cryptography. The relativistic protocol described in Ref. [6] is impractical in a rather strong
sense: the laws of physics appear to preclude using it to maintain a commitment indefinitely,
since current physical theories imply an upper bound on the attainable rate of communica-
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tions emanating from any finite spatial region. That protocol aside, all previous methods
of bit commitment have been able to guarantee security only modulo the assumed compu-
tational difficulty of some task (such as factoring a large number) or modulo the assumed
physical difficulty of some process (such as breaking into a locked safe, or storing entangled
quantum states [1]). That is, all previous bit commitment protocols have in principle been
insecure against a sufficiently technologically advanced cheater.
The new protocol described here not only has the theoretical virtue of needing only
a constant communication rate, but also, as we explain below, can be implemented with
current technology. If, as we conjecture, the protocol is secure against all quantum attacks
as well as classical attacks, it gives a practical solution to the bit commitment problem
which is unconditionally secure in the sense that it relies on no computational complexity
assumptions, classical or quantum. It relies on no physical assumptions either, other than
the well-established principle that signals cannot travel faster than light.
For completeness, we note that Popescu [19] subsequently pointed out that Mayers’ and
Lo-Chau’s models of cryptographic protocols neglect the existence of quantum superselection
rules. One might perhaps think this gives another way of using a physical principle to ensure
the security of a quantum bit commitment scheme, but this possibility was later excluded
by Mayers, Kitaev and Preskill [17].
II. DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS
For the main part of this paper, we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s actions are limited to
those allowed by classical physics, under which heading we include special relativity but not
general relativity nor, of course, quantum theory. This means that in particular we allow the
parties in the protocol to send, share and manipulate classical information but not quantum
information. We are thus content for the moment to use a definition of bit commitment
that is adequate in the context of classical information theory, and postpone till section 7
discussion of the subtleties that arise when considering quantum information.
First, we define the general form of a classical bit commitment protocol. A protocol must
require Alice and Bob to exchange classical information according to prescribed rules, with
probability distributions prescribed whenever they are required to make random choices,
and perhaps with some prescribed constraints on the places from and times at which the
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information is sent. In Alice’s case, the rules should depend on the value of the bit b to
which she wishes to commit herself. The protocol must include a commitment phase with
a definite end, after which Alice is, if she has followed the protocol correctly, committed to
a bit b of her choice. It may also include a sustaining phase after the commitment, during
which both parties continue communications and/or other operations in order to maintain
the commitment. And it must include an unveiling phase, which Alice can initiate if she
chooses, in which she unveils the committed bit to Bob by supplying further information
which is supposed to convince him that she was committed to the bit b.
An attempted unveiling of the bit b is any attempt by Alice to use the unveiling procedure,
at any point after the commitment, by sending information to Bob in the hope that it
constitutes satisfactory evidence (as defined by the protocol) that Alice was committed to the
bit b. An attempted unveiling of the bit bmight fail either by producing satisfactory evidence
that Alice was actually committed to the bit b¯, or else by failing to produce satisfactory
evidence that she was committed to either bit value. A successful unveiling of the bit b is an
attempt by Alice to use the unveiling procedure which succeeds in producing satisfactory
evidence (as defined by the protocol) that she was committed to the bit b. Note that in
principle this could happen even though Alice has not actually followed the protocol for
committing and unveiling the bit b.
For the protocol to be perfectly secure against Bob it must guarantee that, however he
proceeds, he cannot obtain any information about the committed bit unless and until Alice
chooses to unveil it. For it to be perfectly secure against Alice, it must guarantee that,
however she proceeds, after the point at which she is supposed to be committed, either her
probability of successfully unveiling 0 is zero or her probability of successfully unveiling 1 is
zero. The protocol is secure against Bob if it includes some security parameter n and has the
property that the expectation value of the Shannon information Bob can obtain about the
committed bit is bounded by some function ǫ(n) which tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
It is secure against Alice if, after the point at which she is supposed to be committed,
it guarantees that either her probability of successfully unveiling 0 or her probability of
successfully unveiling 1 is less than ǫ′(n), which again should tend to zero as n tends to
infinity. For the protocol to be perfectly reliable, it must guarantee that, if Alice honestly
follows the protocol to commit and later unveil the bit b, the probability of her unveiling
being successful is one. For it to be reliable, it must guarantee that this probability is greater
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than 1− ǫ′′(n), where ǫ′′(n) again should tend to zero as n tends to infinity.
There may be a case for treating reliability and security on an equal footing. However,
the usual definition of bit commitment requires security and perfect reliability, but not
necessarily perfect security, and we follow this convention here, since the distinction makes
no essential difference to our discussion. That is, we require that a bit commitment protocol
should be secure against both parties and perfectly reliable. If a protocol can guarantee
this, regardless of the technology or computing power available to the parties, within the
model defined by some physical theory, then it is unconditionally secure within that theory.
The relevant physical theory here — until we consider the role of quantum information, in
section VII onward — is relativistic classical physics in Minkowski space.
We use units in which the speed of light c = 1 and choose inertial coordinates, so that the
minimum possible time for a light signal to go from one point in space to another is equal
to their spatial separation. We consider a cryptographic scenario in which coordinates are
agreed by Alice and Bob, who also agree on two points x1, x2. Alice and Bob are required
to erect laboratories, including sending and receiving stations, within an agreed distance δ
of the points, where ∆x = |x1 − x2| ≫ δ. These laboratories need not be restricted in size
or shape, except that they must not overlap.
We refer to the laboratories in the vicinity of xi as Ai and Bi, for i = 1 or 2. To
avoid unnecessarily proliferating notation, we use the same labels for the agents (sentient
or otherwise) assumed to be occupying these laboratories. The agents A1 and A2 may be
separate individuals or devices, but we assume that they are collaborating with complete
mutual trust and with completely prearranged agreements on how to proceed, to the extent
that for cryptanalytic purposes we can identify them together simply as a single entity, Alice
(A); similarly B1 and B2 are identified as Bob (B).
As usual in defining a cryptographic scenario for a protocol between mistrustful parties,
we suppose Alice and Bob each trust absolutely the security and integrity of their own lab-
oratories, in the sense that they are confident that all their sending, receiving and analysing
devices function properly and also that nothing within their laboratories can be observed
by outsiders. They also have confidence in the locations of their own laboratories in the
agreed coordinate system, and in clocks set up within their laboratories. However, neither
of them trusts any third party or channel or device outside their own laboratory. We also
assume that A1 and A2 either have, or can securely generate as needed during the protocol,
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an indefinite string of shared secret random bits.
Strictly speaking, if A1 and A2 are disconnected laboratories, this arrangement requires
A to trust something outside her laboratories — for instance the coordinates of distant stars
— in order to establish their relative locations, and similarly for B. Purists in the matter
of cryptographic paranoia might thus instead require that A1 and A2 are separated regions
within one large laboratory controlled by A (which must be long in one dimension, of size
order ∆x, but could be small in the other two dimensions), and similarly for Bob’s agents,
with A’s and B’s laboratories still of course kept disjoint. In this case, agents in A1 and
A2 can establish their relative separation by measurements within A’s laboratory; similarly
agents in B1 and B2 need only carry out measurements within B’s laboratory. Though the
participants still need to believe that Minkowski space is a good approximate description
of the world outside their laboratories in order to have confidence in the protocol, they
then need trust nothing outside their laboratories in order to trust their implementation
of it. This arrangement also allows A1 and A2 to use a secure channel within their shared
laboratory to share secret random bits as needed during the protocol, eliminating the need
for them either to share an unbounded string of secret random bits or to establish a secure
external channel between two disconnected laboratories.
To ensure in advance that their clocks are synchronised and that their communication
channels transmit at sufficiently near light speed, the parties may check that test signals
sent out from each of Bob’s laboratories receive a response within time 4δ from Alice’s
neighbouring laboratory, and vice versa. However, the parties need not disclose the precise
locations of their laboratories in order to implement the protocol. Nor need Alice or Bob
take it on trust that the other has set up laboratories in the stipulated region. (A protocol
which required such trust would, of course, be fatally flawed.) The reason is that each can
verify that the other is not significantly deviating from the protocol by checking the times
at which signals from the other party arrive. For each party can verify from these arrival
times, together with the times of their own transmissions, that particular specified pairs of
signals, going from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice, were generated independently —
and this guarantee is all that is required for security.
Given a laboratory configuration as above, one can set out precise timing constraints for
all communications in a protocol in order to ensure the independence of all pairs of signals
which are required to be generated independently. We may use the time coordinate in the
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agreed frame to order the signals in the protocol. (Without such a convention there would
be some ambiguity, since the time ordering is frame dependent).
In fact, the protocols we consider are unconditionally secure against Bob regardless of his
actions: Alice needs no guarantees about the location of his laboratories or the independence
of the messages he sends during the protocol. However, Bob needs some guarantees about
the independence of Alice’s messages, which can be ensured by the following arrangement.
We say that two spacetime regions P and Q are sufficiently spacelike separated if it is the
case that if Alice receives a message sent from within the region P and sends a reply which
is received by Bob within that region, and receives a message from within Q and sends a
reply which is received by Bob within Q, then Bob will be assured that the first reply was
generated independently of the second received message and the second reply was generated
independently of the first received message. Now we choose two sequences of spacetime
regions P1, P2, . . . and Q1, Q2, . . . with the properties that:
(i) P1 is sufficiently spacelike separated from Q1, Q1 from P2, P2 from Q2, Q2 from P3 and
so on;
(ii) the spacetime regions P1, P2, . . . are defined by the same region P in space, namely the
ball of radius δ around the point x1, and successive disjoint time intervals [s1, s
′
1] , [s2, s
′
2] , . . .;
similarly the Qj are defined by the same spatial region Q, namely the ball of radius δ
around the point x2, and successive disjoint time intervals [t1, t
′
1] , [t2, t
′
2] , . . .;
(iii) the regions are strictly time ordered in the agreed time coordinate, with ordering
P1 , Q1 , P2 , Q2 , . . ., so that we have s1 < s
′
1 < t1 < t
′
1 < s2 < s
′
2 < t2 < t
′
2 < . . .;
(iv) the time intervals are all of the same length ∆t, where ∆t > 4δ and ∆t≪ ∆x.
Note that these conditions allow a single agent (person or device) A1 to be responsible
for all Alice’s communications from the regions Pi and a second agent A2 to be responsible
for all her communications from the regions Qi, and similarly for Bob, as suggested by the
earlier discussion.
It is then easy to define timing constraints, in terms of δ ,∆x and ∆t, which, if respected
by A and B, and if A’s and B’s laboratories are sited as prescribed, ensure that A1 can
receive a message from B1 sent from within P1 and send a reply which will be received
within P1, then that A2 can receive a message from B2 sent from within Q1 and send a reply
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which will be received within Q1, then that A1 can receive a message from B1 sent from
within P2 and send a reply which will be received within P2, and so on. Each message-reply
exchange constitutes one round of the commitment protocol. To keep the notation simple
in the following discussion, we take these constraints as implicitly specified, and identify
rounds of the protocol by the spacetime region Pi or Qi in which they take place.
III. THE RELATIVISTIC BIT COMMITMENT PROTOCOL RBC1
We now recall the bit commitment protocol — call it RBC1 — described in Ref. [6].
Alice and Bob first agree a large number N , a security parameter for RBC1. In what
follows we take N = 2m to be a power of 2, and where convenient also refer to m as the
security parameter. Taking N to be a power of 2 simplifies the description of the protocol,
since it allows the various random numbers generated and transmitted by the parties to be
efficiently coded in binary. Note, however, that both RBC1 and RBC2 (defined below) can
be defined for any N . Optimally efficient implementations — those which attain a given
security level with minimal communication requirements — may generally require N to be
other than a power of 2.
All arithmetic in the protocol is carried out modulo N . Before the protocol begins, A1
and A2 agree on a list {m1, m2, . . .} of independently chosen random integers in the range
0 ≤ mi < N . B1 and B2 also need to generate lists of random pairs of integers (nj,0, nj,1)
in the range 0 ≤ nj,0, nj,1 < N ; these numbers, which need not be agreed between the
Bi in advance, are drawn from independent uniform distributions, with the constraint that
nj,0 6= nj,1 for each j.
In the first round of the protocol, which takes place within P1, B1 sends A1 the labelled
pair (n1,0, n1,1). On receiving these numbers, A1 returns n1,b +m1 in order to commit the
bit b. This completes the commitment phase.
The second and later rounds of the protocol constitute the sustaining phase. In the
second round, which takes place within Q1, B2 asks A2 to commit to him the binary
form a1m−1 . . . a
1
0 of m1. This is achieved by sending A2 the labelled list of m pairs
(n2,0, n2,1), . . . , (nm+1,0, nm+1,1). A2 returns n2,a1
0
+m2, . . . , nm+1,a1m−1 +mm+1.
In the third round, which takes place within P2, B1 asks A1 to commit in similar fashion
the binary forms of the random numbers m2, . . . , mm+1 used by A2; in the fourth round,
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which takes place within Q2, B2 asks A2 to commit the binary forms of the random numbers
mm+2, . . . , mm2+m+1 used by A1 in the third round commitment. And so on; communications
are continued indefinitely in order to sustain the commitment, unless and until Alice chooses
to unveil the committed bit or either party chooses to abandon the protocol.
In fact, the protocol’s security is ensured provided that the differences nj,1 − nj,0 are
random elements of {0, . . . , N − 1}, even if the integers nj,0 or nj,1 are not. A natural
alternative convention would thus be to choose nj,0 = 0 for all j and take the nj,1 to
be independently randomly chosen in the range 0 < nj,1 < N . If A and B adopt this
convention, there is obviously no need for B to transmit the values of nj,0. We have kept the
option of general nj,0 partly for notational convenience, but also because we have no proof
that every possible level of security is most efficiently attained by setting nj,0 = 0.
We now define the unveiling protocol. Define the index ı¯ to be the alternate value to
i; e.g. A1¯ = A2. Either or both of the Ai may choose to unveil the originally committed
bit. For Ai to unveil, she reveals to Bi the set of random numbers used by Aı¯ in Aı¯’s last
set of commitments, sending the signal sufficiently early that when Bi receives it he will be
guaranteed that it was generated independently of the message sent by Bı¯ to Aı¯ to initiate
this last set of commitments. To check the unveiling, Bi sends the unveiling data to Bı¯, who
checks through the data to ensure that all the commitments in the protocol are consistent
and correspond to a valid commitment of a bit b in the first round. If so, he accepts that
Alice was genuinely committed to the bit b from the point at which the first round was
completed.
To allow A1 to unveil soon after the first round — which the protocol RBC2, discussed
below, requires — we need to vary this procedure, since there is no previous round of
commitments about which she can supply data. A1 can unveil after the first round by
revealing to B1 the set of random numbers which will be used by A2 in the second round,
sending the signal sufficiently early that when B1 receives it he will be guaranteed that it
was generated independently of the messages sent by B2 to A2 to initiate the second round
of commitments.
Since it takes a finite time for the relevant signals to reach Bob’s agents, the protocol is
not immediately completed by Alice’s unveiling message. It is the need to wait for receipt
of information that is unknown to the unveiler Ai (since it depends on the last set of pairs
sent by Bı¯) and to the unveilee Bi (since it includes the last set of commitments sent by Aı¯)
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which ensures that the protocol is not vulnerable to a Mayers-Lo-Chau quantum attack.
RBC1 requires the Ai and Bi to exchange sequences of strings of exponentially increasing
length, each exchange taking place within a time interval of length less than ∆t. This requires
exponentially increasing communication rates. It also requires either that the Ai previously
generated a list of shared secret random numbers whose length depends exponentially on
the duration of the protocol, or else that they generate and securely share such a list during
the protocol. The second option requires an exponentially increasing secure communication
rate, and also requires the generation of random numbers at an exponentially increasing
rate. The Bi also need to generate a sequence of random numbers whose length depends
exponentially on the duration of the protocol, though they do not need to share them. In the
following sections we define a refinement of RBC1 that avoids all these impractical features.
It is perhaps worth noting here that the arrangement of A1 and A2 used above for
RBC1, and in a later section for the improved protocol RBC2, represents just one possible
configuration of agents. It might sometimes be useful in practice to have more agents
participating in the protocol, or to allow the agents to be more mobile, or both. For instance,
one might imagine applications in which it is important for A to be able to allow any of her
agents, anywhere, to initiate an unveiling as soon as they learn some critical fact. One way
of doing this is to use the above arrangement for the commitment and sustaining phases of
the protocol, but to arrange in addition that A and B maintain large numbers of additional
agents densely distributed in the same spatial region, with all Alice’s random bits shared
among all her agents.
IV. RUDICH’S SCHEME FOR LINKING COMMITTED BITS
In the following section we improve RBC1 using a technique developed (for a different
purpose) by Rudich [20]. Since Rudich’s idea applies to any type of classical bit commitment,
it is most naturally described abstractly — so, in this section, we need not consider separated
laboratories, relativistic signalling constraints, timings or locations.
Suppose that A and B are equipped with a black box oracle that generates secure com-
mitments to B of bits specified by A, and unveils the bits to B if (and only if) A requests it
to. Suppose now that A wishes to commit to two bits, b1 and b2, in a way that will allow her
subsequently to demonstrate to B that the committed bits are equal, without giving B any
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information about their shared bit value b = b1 = b2, and while still retaining a commitment
of this shared bit b, which can subsequently be unveiled if she chooses. Rudich some time
ago [20] pointed out a simple and elegant way to achieve this. A version of Rudich’s scheme,
slightly modified to adapt it for relativistic bit commitments, follows.
First, A and B agree on the value of a large integer M , which serves as a security
parameter. Now, A makes a redundant commitment of the bit b1 using 2M elementary bit
commitments of bits bij1 , where the index i runs from 1 to 2 and j runs from 1 to M , with
the property that the b1j1 are chosen randomly and independently and the b
2j
1 are defined
by the constraint that b1j1 ⊕ b
2j
1 = b1 for each j. Alice also makes a redundant commitment
of the bit b2 using 4M elementary commitments of bits, b
ij
2 , defined similarly but with j
running from 1 to 2M , with the b1j2 chosen randomly and independently of the b
1j
1 as well
as each other.
To test the equality of the committed bits b1 and b2, B proceeds as follows. B chooses
a random one-to-one map f from {1, . . . ,M} to {1, . . . , 2M}. For each j from 1 to M , B
then asks A whether the pairs (b1j1 , b
2j
1 ) and (b
1f(j)
2 , b
2f(j)
2 ) are equal (i.e. b
1j
1 = b
1f(j)
2 and
b2j1 = b
2f(j)
2 ) or opposite (i.e. b
1j
1 = 1 − b
1f(j)
2 and b
2j
1 = 1 − b
2f(j)
2 ). If A has followed the
protocol correctly, and the bits b1 and b2 are indeed equal, then one of these two cases must
apply for any given j, and A states which, for each j. B then tests A’s answers by choosing
further independent random numbers m(j) ∈ {1, 2} for each j from 1 to M and asking A to
unveil the two bits b
m(j)j
1 and b
m(j)f(j)
2 . A does so, and B checks that these bits are indeed
equal, or opposite, as claimed.
If A passes all these tests, B accepts that indeed A was committed to two bits b1 and
b2 with b1 = b2. B accepts also that the M remaining unopened pairs of bits (b
1k
2 , b
2k
2 ),
corresponding to values k not in the image of f , together constitute a redundant commitment
to the common bit value b = b1 = b2 of the same form as the original commitment to b1.
The following security features are sufficient for our purposes.
Security against B: Clearly, if the protocol is correctly followed by A, B obtains
no information about b.
Security against A: The following definitions assume a fixed parameter γ. Any
value of γ in the range 0 < γ < 1/2 suffices to prove the security of Rudich’s linking scheme.
For the moment we will not specify γ further; we will make a specific choice later. We say
A is effectively R-committed (R here stands for Rudich) to b1 if at least (1− γ)M of the M
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pairs that are supposed to define the redundant commitment to b1 are of the correct form:
i.e. if b1j1 ⊕ b
2j
1 = b1 for at least (1 − γ)M different values of j. We say A is effectively
R-committed to b2 if at least (2 − γ)M of the 2M pairs that are supposed to define the
redundant commitment to b2 are of the correct form.
Note that, according to these definitions, if A is effectively R-committed to b1 by M
pairs of bit commitments and effectively R-committed to b2 by 2M pairs, then, after the
tests (and regardless of their result), the remaining M unopened pairs will again effectively
R-commit her to b2 in the first sense. That is, at least (1− γ)M of the remaining M pairs
define a redundant commitment to b2.
Lemma 1 Suppose A’s Rudich linking does not effectively R-commit her to both
b1 = b and b2 = b, for some bit value b. (That is, either she is not effectively R-committed to
at least one of the bits, or she is effectively R-committed to two different bit values.) Let ǫ(M)
be the maximum probability of A’s passing B’s tests, optimised over all bit configurations
satisfying these constraints. Then ǫ(M) ≈ exp(−CM) as M tends to infinity, for some
positive constant C.
Proof
Suppose (1 − γ1)M of the M pairs defining A’s first Rudich commitment define the bit
b1 = b, and the remaining γ1M define the bit b1 = b¯. Suppose (2 − 2γ2)M of the M pairs
defining A’s second Rudich commitment define the bit b2 = b, and the remaining 2γ2M define
the bit b2 = b¯. As A is not effectively R-committed to either b or b¯ with both commitments,
we have that max(γ1, 2γ2) > γ and max(1− γ1, 2− 2γ2) > γ.
Each of the γ1M bits from the first commitment that are committed to b¯ has a probability
(1 − γ2) of being tested against a commitment to b from the second commitment, Each of
the (1− γ1)M bits from the first commitment that are committed to b has a probability γ2
of being tested against a commitment to b¯ from the second commitment. The probability
of passing all these tests is of order
(1
2
)M(γ1(1−γ2)+γ2(1−γ1))
≤
(1
2
)Mγ
2 .
(The inequality follows since x(1 − y) + y(1 − x) ≥ γ
2
for any x, y in the range (0, 1) such
that max(x, y) > γ
2
and max(1− x, 1− y) > γ
2
.)
Remark To keep a sequence of linked bit commitments secure against A, B wants
to ensure that he will almost certainly detect cheating unless A is effectively R-committed
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to the same bit for the first and last commitments. From the note preceding the above
lemma, we see that, if A’s first and last commitments are not effectively R-committed to the
same bit value, some intermediate adjacent pair of commitments must fail to be effectively
R-committed. Any value of γ < 1
2
such that γM is an integer can be used in the definition
of effective R-commitment here. We can now apply the lemma and minimise our bound on
the probability of A escaping detection by taking γM = ⌊M−1
2
⌋, where ⌊x⌋ is the largest
integer less than or equal to x. We thus see A’s probability of successful cheating is bounded
by a term of order
(
1
2
)
1
2
(⌊M−1
2
⌋) ≈ (
1
2
)
M
4 .
V. USE OF RUDICH’S LINKING IN FINITE CHANNEL RELATIVISTIC BIT
COMMITMENT
Our key idea for improving RBC1 is the following. If b1 represents a relativistic bit
commitment, and b2 another relativistic bit commitment begun at a later round than b1,
then A can use Rudich’s technique to link these commitments by showing that b1 = b2 = b.
After doing so, she maintains a commitment to their common bit value, drawn from a subset
of the elementary commitments used for b2. She can thus abandon the commitment to b1 at
this point, while remaining committed to b via a subset of the elementary commitments for
b2, and start a new commitment for a bit b3. Letting bi take the role of bi−1 for i = 2, 3, she
then repeats the procedure above iteratively. A’s commitment to the bit b is thus always
defined by elementary commitments made in a recent round, so avoiding the exponential
blowup that makes RBC1 impractical.
There are a variety of ways of implementing this basic strategy. One of the simplest
is the following protocol, which we call RBC2. This uses iterations of the relativistic bit
commitment protocol RBC1 as sub-protocols. RBC2 has two security parameters: N , the
security parameter for the RBC1 sub-protocols, and M , the security parameter used in the
Rudich linking protocol.
The first iteration of the linking mechanism is as follows. In region P1, A1 redundantly
commits a bit b1 = b using a Rudich coding with M pairs of individual relativistic bit
commitments made using RBC1. This relativistic commitment is sustained by A2 in the
region Q1. A second redundant bit commitment, b2 = b, using 2M pairs of individual
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relativistic bit commitments, is begun by A1 in the region P2. Also in the region P2, A1 and
B1 go through the Rudich linking protocol for b1 and b2. In the case of b1, A1 can unveil
elementary relativistic bit commitments, when required by the linking protocol, by revealing
the random numbers used by A2 in Q1 to sustain these commitments. In the case of b2, A1’s
required unveilings are made by revealing the random numbers that will be used by A2 in
Q2 to sustain the relevant commitments.
In both cases, B needs to collect together the information supplied by A1 (in P2) and A2
(inQ1 orQ2) in order to verify that A has passed the tests in the linking protocol. Once this is
done, and B has established that b1 = b2, the remaining unopened elementary commitments
defining b1 may be discontinued. All the 2M pairs of elementary commitments defining b2
are sustained by A2 in Q2, since she does not know which of the elementary commitments
was unveiled by A1 in P2. Of these 2M pairs, M remain unopened and define a redundant
commitment for b, and both A1 and B1 know the identity of these M after communications
in P2 have ended. They can thus use the redundant bit commitment defined by these M
pairs for another iteration of the linking mechanism in P3.
In this second iteration, in the region P3, A1 makes a third redundant bit commitment,
b3 = b, to B1, using 2M pairs of individual relativistic bit commitments, and goes through
a second Rudich linking, proving (eventually) to B1 that b3 = b1.
And so on: A1 initiates a new redundant commitment to, and goes through a Rudich
linking with, B1, for each round they participate in after the first. A2 and B2 simply sustain
each of the commitments initiated by A1 and B1 for one round.
VI. PROOF OF SECURITY OF RBC2 AGAINST CLASSICAL ATTACKS
Security against B: If the Ai honestly follow the protocol using secret shared in-
dependently generated random numbers, then whatever strategy the Bi use, the information
they receive is uncorrelated with the committed bit. The protocol is thus perfectly secure
against Bob.
Security against A: A key constraint on Alice is that B1 may request A1 to unveil
any of the individual RBC1 relativistic bit commitments made during the protocol. B1 will
request M of the first batch of 2M commitments to be unveiled during the linking protocol
in P2. Of every successive batch of 4M commitments, B1 will request that A1 unveil M of
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them as soon as they are committed, and another M two rounds later. Thus, if M is large,
unless A1 is able to provide a valid unveiling of a bit for almost every commitment in every
batch, she will almost certainly be discovered to be cheating.
Now, the relativistically enforced security of RBC1 means that A1 has no strategy that
will allow her a high probability of successfully producing valid unveilings for both 0 and 1
for any of the elementary RBC1 commitments. To unveil a commitment that she has just
initiated in Pi, she must supply m m-bit numbers that correspond to a valid commitment
by A2 in Qi of an m-bit number that corresponds to a valid commitment of a bit b by A1
in Pi. Similarly, to unveil in Pi+1 a commitment she initiated in Pi, she needs to supply m
m-bit numbers that correspond to a valid commitment by A2 in Qi of an m-bit number that
corresponds to a valid commitment of a bit b by A1 in Pi. Either way, if she is able, with
significant probability, to produce valid unveilings of both values of b, she is also able to
infer, with significant probability, the differences between the m pairs of random numbers,
(ni,0 − ni,1) sent by B2 to A2 in the commitment round in Qi. (With our convention that
ni,0 = 0, this is equivalent to inferring the ni,1.) But, if B follows the protocol honestly, all
(N−1)m possible sets of difference values are equiprobable, and A1 can have no information
available to her, either in Pi or Pi+1, about the actual difference values, assuming that
our current understanding of physics correctly assures us that superluminal signalling is
impossible.
Suppose that N ≥ 4, so that m ≥ 2 and (N − 1)m ≥ 9. Then in particular, for each
elementary commitment, there can be at most one set of m numbers that A1 can use for
unveiling with the knowledge that the probability of unveiling a valid bit commitment is
> 1/3. Thus, for each elementary commitment, A1 can successfully unveil at most one of
the bit values 0 and 1 with probability > 1/3. We say A1 is probabilistically committed to
the bit value b if she can successfully unveil b with probability > 1/3.
By analogy with our earlier definition, we say Alice is probabilistically effectively RR-
committed (RR here stands for relativistic Rudich) to the bit b by the redundant commitment
initiated in round 1 if she is probabilistically committed by each elementary bit commitment
in a subset of (1 − γ)M of the M pairs of elementary commitments and these bit values
constitute a Rudich coding for the bit b among these pairs. We say she is probabilistically
effectively RR-committed to the bit b by the redundant commitment initiated in any later
round if she is probabilistically committed by each elementary bit commitment in a subset
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of (2 − γ)M of the 2M pairs of elementary commitments and these bit values constitute a
Rudich coding for the bit b among these pairs.
We take γ < 1
2
, so that Alice can be probabilistically effectively RR-committed to at
most one bit value in any given round.
Lemma 2 Suppose A is not probabilistically effectively RR-committed to both b1 = b
and b2 = b, for some bit value b, on any two successive rounds of RBC2. (That is, either
she is not probabilistically effectively RR-committed to at least one of the bits, or she
is probabilistically effectively RR-committed to two different bit values.) Let ǫ(M) be the
maximum probability of A’s passing B’s tests, optimised over all bit configurations satisfying
these constraints. Then ǫ(M) ≈ exp(−CM) as M tends to infinity, for some positive
constant C.
Proof
Suppose y1M of the M pairs defining A’s first Rudich commitment define the bit b1 = b,
and that y¯1M define the bit b1 = b¯. Suppose y2M of the M pairs defining A’s second Rudich
commitment define the bit b2 = b, and that y¯2M define the bit b2 = b¯. Each of the y1M bits
from the first commitment that are committed to b has probability (1− y2) of being tested
against a pair from the second commitment that does not commit to b. Similar calculations
for the other possibilities lead to an expected total of (1 − y1y2 − y¯1y¯2)M tests that have
probability ≥ 1
3
of failure.
As A is not probabilistically effectively RR-committed to either b or b¯ with both com-
mitments, we have that max(1 − y1, 2 − 2y2) > γ and max(1 − y¯1, 2 − 2y¯2) > γ. By an
argument similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 1, the probability of passing all the
tests is bounded by a term of order
(2
3
)M( 1
2
γ)
.
QED.
Remark Note that if A1 is probabilistically effectively committed to a Rudich cod-
ing for a bit b by a commitment initiated in Pi, she cannot be probabilistically effectively
committed to a coding for the opposite bit b¯ in Pi+1, since she learns no information in the
mean time about the round that takes place in Qi. Thus, unless she is probabilistically ef-
fectively committed to the same bit in both Pi and Pi+1, she must fail to be probabilistically
effectively committed to any bit value in at least one of the two regions.
As before, we take γM = ⌊M−1
2
⌋. We thus see any cheating by A will be detected with
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probability of order
(
1− (
2
3
)
1
2
(⌊M−1
2
⌋)
)
≈
(
1− (
2
3
)
M
4
)
.
Remark Alice can only usefully cheat either by failing to be probabilistically ef-
fectively Rudich committed to any bit by some set of M pairs at some point, or by being
effectively Rudich committed to some bit b by a set of M pairs and failing to be effectively
Rudich committed to b by the corresponding set of 2M pairs at some point. It is not hard
to show that, among the commitment strategies covered by these options, the one that min-
imises her probability of being detected cheating in the relevant Rudich test is for all M
pairs from the first set to probabilistically commit to the same bit b, while (⌊2M−1
4
⌋+1) (i.e.
M
2
if M is even, and M+1
2
if M is odd) of the pairs from the second set commit to b¯ and the
remainder to b. We can thus find an exact lower bound on the probability p(M) of being
detected: for example, if M is even we have
p(M) ≤
M/2∑
r=0
(
2
3
)r


M
2
r




3M
2
M − r



 2M
M


−1
For suitably large M , deviating from the protocol risks detection while giving her essen-
tially no possibility of successfully cheating. If Alice is rational and values her reputation
for integrity, she will thus honestly follow the protocol throughout, committing (not just
probabilistically effectively committing) herself to a Rudich coding of the same bit value b
in each round.
VII. DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY FOR QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT
We want to consider the security of RBC2 when the possibility of the parties sharing,
storing and manipulating quantum information is taken into account. We still assume that
physics takes place in Minkowski spacetime, with the Minkowski causal structure, but now
suppose that the correct description of physics is some relativistic version of quantum theory.
Without specifying the details of this theory, we simply assume that the parties can devise
their own consistent labelling of physically realisable orthogonal basis states. To allow as
much scope for cheaters as possible, we also assume that any localised party is able to apply
arbitrary local quantum operations to quantum states in their possession.
Before considering the specifics of RBC2, we need to consider the general definition
of security for a bit commitment protocol that may involve quantum information. The
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definitions of reliability and perfect reliability and of security and perfect security against
Bob are as for classical bit commitment. However, we need a more general definition of
security against Alice. Suppose that we have reached the first point in the protocol at
which Alice is supposed to be committed. We define psup0 to be supremum of the set of her
probabilities of successfully unveiling 0 over all strategies she could pursue from this point
onwards; similarly psup1 . We say that the protocol is perfectly secure against Alice if, for any
possible initial commitment strategy, it guarantees that psup0 + p
sup
1 ≤ 1. It is secure against
Alice if, for any possible initial commitment strategy, it guarantees that psup0 +p
sup
1 ≤ 1+ǫ
′(n),
where ǫ′(n) tends to 0 as n tends to infinity [7].
To see the point of the definitions, consider the standard model of classical bit commit-
ment in which Alice writes her committed bit on a piece of paper and places it in a safe,
which she then locks, before handing the safe over to Bob. In this model, she unveils the bit
by giving Bob the combination, allowing him to open the safe and read the paper. Modulo
physical assumptions about the impossibility of remotely manipulating the contents of the
safe, this is perfectly secure against Alice.
Now, in an idealised quantum version of this protocol, Alice could create a superposition
α|0〉A|0〉S+β|1〉A|1〉S, where |0〉S and |1〉S are the commitment states for 0 and 1 respectively,
and then place the second system, described by the |〉S states, in the safe. The probabilities
of Bob reading the commitments for 0 and 1 when he opens the safe are respectively |α|2
and |β|2, which sum to 1.
Modulo the same physical assumptions as before, this is a perfectly secure protocol that
commits Alice, in the sense that she cannot alter the contents of the safe or affect the
probabilities of 0 and 1 being unveiled. However, it does not satisfy the definition of perfect
security we gave for classical bit commitment, which requires that either the probability of
successfully unveiling 0 or that of successfully unveiling 1 should vanish. This distinction
between classical and quantum definitions of security was noted and discussed in Ref. [4].
This suggests that the natural definition for perfect security for a quantum bit commit-
ment protocol is that given above, while the classical definition implies something stronger,
which we call bit commitment with a certificate of classicality [7]. The quantum definition
of imperfect security is then a natural extension: as in the classical case, it allows that
Alice may have scope for cheating but requires that any cheating advantage can be made
arbitrarily small.
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Another historical reason for favouring the definitions of quantum security just given, and
against applying the classical definitions to quantum bit commitment, is that the former,
unlike the latter, are in line with Mayers’ and Lo-Chau’s analyses of cheating strategies
for quantum bit commitment protocols. Mayers’ and Lo-Chau’s essential results were that,
in non-relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols conforming to their cryptographic
models, perfect security against Bob implies that psup0 +p
sup
1 = 2, and that in a protocol with
security parameter n, security against Bob implies that psup0 + p
sup
1 = 2 − δ(n), where δ(n)
tends to 0 as n tends to infinity. In other words, all such quantum bit commitment protocols
are insecure (in fact, maximally or near-maximally insecure) by our quantum definition. On
the other hand, if we regarded a certificate of classicality as part of the definition of a
quantum bit commitment, showing that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is
impossible would only require showing that no quantum protocol can guarantee to prevent
the commitment of superposed bits — a much simpler result that can be proven in one line,
without appealing to Mayers’ and Lo-Chau’s analyses [8].
VIII. SECURITY OF RBC2 AGAINST QUANTUM ATTACKS
Security against B: Allowing for the possibility of Bob storing or manipulating
quantum information does not affect the security argument given earlier. If the Ai honestly
follow the protocol using secret shared independently generated random numbers, then what-
ever strategy the Bi use, the information they receive is uncorrelated with the committed
bit. The protocol is thus perfectly secure against Bob.
Security against A: Alice certainly has the option, allowed by our definition of
security for quantum bit commitment, of committing a qubit belonging to an entangled
superposition. To see this, consider first a quantum strategy applicable to RBC1. Suppose
that before the protocol A1 and A2 share a commitment state α|0〉1|0〉2 + β|1〉1|1〉2 and
a string of superposed number states of the form
∑N−1
r=0 |r〉1|r〉2. If A1 receives the pair
(n1,0, n1,1) from B1 and runs the first round of the protocol on a quantum computer, using
her part of the commitment state and the first superposed number state as input, and returns
k as output, the joint state becomes
α|0〉1|k − n1,0〉1|0〉2|k − n1,0〉2 + β|1〉1|k − n1,1〉1|1〉2|k − n1,1〉2
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tensored with the remaining superposed number states [4]. A2 and A1 can proceed similarly
at each successive round, maintaining a superposed commitment. Either of them can consis-
tently unveil the bit when required, by measuring their commitment state and their random
number states, producing a consistent unveiling of 0 (with probability |α|2) or of 1 (with
probability |β|2). But now it is clear that the same basic strategy extends to RBC2, pro-
vided the Ai share appropriate superposed entangled states: in particular, every unveiling
required in RBC2 can be consistently made without destroying the quantum superposition
of the committed bit.
Of course, this strategy of using shared entanglement gives Alice no control over which
bit will be unveiled, so its existence is consistent with the quantum security of RBC1 and
RBC2. To establish that security, we need arguments parallel to those in the classical
case, establishing that the Ai have essentially no alternative but to implement this strategy
honestly, since any cheating will be detected with near certainty. We conjecture that this is
indeed the case, and that both protocols are secure against quantum attacks.
One can easily show that RBC1 and RBC2 are temporarily secure against quantum
attack, round by round, in the following sense.
Lemma 3 Let pj,sup0 be the supremum of the set of probabilities of the relevant Ai
successfully unveiling 0 in round j, for all possible unveiling strategies she could implement
in that round; similarly pj,sup1 . Then p
j,sup
0 + p
j,sup
1 ≤ 1 + ǫ, where ǫ ≡ ǫ(N) (in the case of
RBC1) or ǫ ≡ ǫ(M,N) (in the case of RBC2), and in either case tends to 0 as the security
parameter(s) tend(s) to infinity.
Proof First note that at any given point in the protocol A1 and A2 share a quantum
state. We may suppose without loss of generality that, whenever the Bi receive a state from
the Ai during the protocol, they measure it in the computational basis. The Ai thus share
no entanglement with the Bi. Hence, if we include in the definition of their shared state all
ancillae that the Ai may have ready for use later in the protocol (either for continuing the
commitment or for unveiling), then without loss of generality we can take their shared state
to be pure: call it |ψ〉.
Let Ai be the party attempting an unveiling on round j. To simplify the discussion a
little we assume that the suprema defined above are attainable: that is, optimal strategies
exist. (The argument below can easily be extended to cover the possibility that the suprema
are not attained, by considering near-optimal strategies.)
22
Her optimal strategy for attempting to unveil a 0 — the optimal strategy that she can
construct given the knowledge available to her, that is — must be defined by a projective
decomposition of the identity {Ai}
m
i=0, representing a von Neumann measurement she will
carry out on |ψ〉, together with an assignment of distinct lists of numbers ri to each of the Ai.
(We can represent general measurements in this way, as we allowed ancillae to be included
in the definition of |ψ〉.) Her unveiling will then consist of carrying out the measurement,
and announcing the ri corresponding to the result Ai. At most one of the ri can correspond
to a valid unveiling of 0. Without loss of generality we can assume that precisely one of
them does — otherwise there is nothing to prove — and let it be r0.
Similarly, her optimal strategy for attempting to unveil a 1 must be defined by a projec-
tive decomposition of the identity {Bi}
n
i=0, together with an assignment of distinct lists of
numbers si to each of the Bi. At most one of the si can correspond to a valid unveiling of
1. Without loss of generality we can assume that precisely one of them does — otherwise
there is nothing to prove — and let it be s0.
Note that we make no assumption here about the relation between the Ai and Bi: in
particular, we do not assume that they represent the same decomposition or commuting
decompositions.
We have that
pj,sup0 = |A0|ψ〉|
2 , pj,sup1 = |B0|ψ〉|
2 .
But now
|A0B0|ψ〉|
2 ≥ (|A0|ψ〉| − |(1−B0)|ψ〉|)
2 = ((pj,sup0 )
1/2 − (1− pj,sup1 )
1/2)2 .
Hence if (pj,sup0 + p
j,sup
1 − 1) is significantly positive, there is a strategy available to Ai —
applying the B projections followed by the A projections — that has a significant probability
of yielding a valid unveiling for both 0 and 1. This means that, with significant probability,
Ai learns information that reveals the differences nk,1− nk,0 in the random numbers sent to
Aı¯ in the previous round. But it is impossible for her to obtain any information about these
differences at this point, since a light signal cannot yet have reached her. QED
Lemma 3 shows in particular that RBC1 and RBC2 are not vulnerable to the type of
attack shown by Mayers and Lo-Chau to imply the insecurity of non-relativistic quantum bit
commitment schemes. In a Mayers-Lo-Chau attack on a protocol perfectly secure against
Bob, Alice can successfully unveil either 0 or 1, each with probability one. This is impossible
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in RBC1 and RBC2, essentially because the Mayers-Lo-Chau attack would require Alice to
implement one of two unitary operations when unveiling, and, while both operations do
indeed exist, she would need to know the random data supplied by Bob on the previous
round in order to be able to construct both of them simultaneously.
A full quantum security analysis would need to consider all possible quantum operations
that Alice might perform. In general, the Ai may initially share arbitrarily many entangled
states of their choice, they may generate and share further entangled states during the
protocol, and they may also communicate classically during the protocol. Whenever one of
them is required to respond to Bob’s queries, she may carry out arbitrary quantum operations
and measurements on the states in her possession before doing so. These quantum operations
may depend on all communications previously received from Bob or from her partner. We
conjecture that RBC1 and RBC2 are secure against general quantum attacks, but have no
proof at present.
IX. COMMENTS ON PRACTICALITY
Security definitions need only consider the asymptotic behaviour of a protocol, but real
world implementations require finite values of the security parameters. Here we give some
estimates of the degree of security attainable against classical attacks, for realistic security
parameter choices. From these we can deduce what is needed in practice to implement
RBC2 with near-perfect security against classical attacks.
RBC2 requires A2 to maintain 4M individual relativistic bit commitments on each round.
Sustaining each of these commitments requires her to commit m bits, and each of these last
commitments requires m bits to be transmitted. Her total bit transmission rate is thus
4Mm2 per round. To allow these commitments, B2 needs to send her 4Mm
2 bits per round
(we assume here that they use the convention ni,0 = 0, saving B2 a factor of 2). These
communications thus take a total of 8Mm2 bits per round.
On the third and later rounds, A1 needs to send 4Mm bits to initiate 4M commitments,
M bits to respond to B1’s queries about pair relations during the linking tests, and 2Mm
2
bits for the unveiling required in the Rudich linking subprotocol. B1 needs to send 4Mm
bits to initiate the commitments (again assuming the convention ni,0 = 0), send ≈M log2M
bits to make a random choice among the (2M)!
M !
possible linkings of pairs, and a further 2M
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bits to query the pair relations. These communications thus take a total of ≈ M(2m2 +
8m+ log2M + 3) bits per round.
For m = 2, the maximum communication cost per round is thus approximately
max(32M,M(27 + log2M)). For small m and M we can easily calculate the communi-
cation cost precisely, as we do in the following illustrative calculations.
We assume a 10 GHz transmission rate and require each round to take place within a tenth
of the time it would take light to travel between A1 and A2. We consider two possibilities
Case I: m = 2 and M = 40;
Case II: m = 2 and M = 200.
For case I, the maximum communication cost per round is 1280 bits, requiring 1.3 ×
10−7 sec. Conservatively allowing a factor of 3 to include the Ai’s data processing time, we
obtain a total elapsed time of 4× 10−7 sec per round. This allows a separation of 4 × 10−6
light seconds, about 1.3 km.
For Case II, the maximum communication cost is 7041 bits per round. Calculating
similarly, we obtain separation of about 9 km.
To get an indication of the security levels attained, we use the bound derived in section
VI on the probability p(M) of Alice’s cheating being detected. This gives bounds on Alice’s
successful cheating probability of 2.4× 10−2 in Case I and 7.3× 10−9 in Case II.
X. DISCUSSION
The secure relativistic protocol RBC2 requires the two parties each to maintain two
dedicated separated secure sites. We estimate that a separation of around 10km should be
adequate even if near-perfect security against cheating is required. Our security analyses
suggest that RBC2 can be implemented with cheating probability bounded by roughly
2× 10−2 using roughly 103 bits of communication per round and by roughly 7× 10−9 using
roughly 104 bits of communication per round. The probability of successful cheating cannot
be smaller than 2−n for a relativistic protocol with n bits of communication per round,
so that these cheating probabilities certainly cannot be improved upon by protocols using
fewer than 6 and 27 bits per round respectively. The scope for reducing the number of
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bits per round (and hence the minimum site separation) for these security levels is thus
not huge: one cannot possibly hope to obtain better than a factor of roughly 300, and we
doubt that this bound is attainable. We cannot, though, exclude the possibility that an
improved security analysis or an improved protocol could allow the site separation to be
reduced by a factor of 101 to 102 or so. Any more substantial reductions would require
faster communications technology. The required separation is inversely proportional to the
achievable communication rate; our estimates assumed 10 GHz communications.
One important caveat is that there is as yet no security proof against general attacks
by parties equipped with arbitrarily powerful quantum computers. This is not to say that
the protocol can be broken by quantum computers. In particular, we have shown that
the protocol is immune to the Mayers-Lo-Chau quantum attack, which breaks all earlier
attempts at unconditionally secure bit commitment. Nonetheless, a complete quantum
security analysis would obviously be highly desirable.
A subtle point, familiar by now to most experts, but potentially confusing to others, is also
worth reiterating here. Using classical bit commitment protocols as a model, one can define
a bit commitment with a certificate of classicality to be a perfectly secure bit commitment
protocol that guarantees from the outset that there is a definite classical bit value, 0 or
1. Classically, bit commitment and bit commitment with a certificate of classicality are
identical, of course, but in the quantum domain the latter is a stronger primitive. It has
been known for some time that, given a protocol for unconditionally secure bit commitment
with a certificate of classicality, parties who can send and receive quantum information
could implement unconditionally secure oblivious transfer [22] (and hence unconditionally
secure multi-party computation, among other tasks). It is also known that neither bit
commitment with a certificate of classicality [7] nor oblivious transfer [9] can be implemented
with unconditional security, even using both quantum information and relativistic signalling
constraints. Our protocols do not contradict these established results: as noted above,
RBC1 and RBC2 implement bit commitment, but not bit commitment with a certificate of
classicality.
An interesting feature of our protocols is that they achieve something that at first sight
might appear to be impossible: secure deniable bit commitment. Suppose that, after a
certain point, Alice chooses neither to sustain the commitment nor to unveil the bit, and that
her two representatives then exchange all the data they received during the protocol. She can
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then produce two different accounts of her actions, consistent respectively with her having
made and sustained commitments to zero and one respectively during the period in which she
participated in the protocol. Of course, since she has stopped sustaining the commitment
at this point, there is no compelling reason for anyone to believe whichever account she
produces. However, the accounts cannot be disproved by other parties. Generally speaking,
deniability is useful in potentially adverse environments, in which a party may be compelled
to give an account of their actions and may face sanctions if that account is inconsistent with
their recorded behaviour during the protocol. The possibility of deniable bit commitment
seems particularly interesting given the potential uses of bit commitment as a sub-protocol
in protocols for tasks such as secure elections.
The protocol has another interesting (and related) feature. As we noted above, if Alice
is equipped with quantum computers, she can use RBC2 to commit an arbitrary qubit. If
her agents choose not to sustain the commitment after some point, and if they are able to
exchange quantum information, they can reconstruct the committed qubit (even when it
was unknown to them — i.e. when they do not have its classical description, nor any other
classical or quantum information about it). In terminology proposed by Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade
and Dominique Unruh, the qubit commitment is retractable: Alice can, so to speak, take the
committed qubit back from Bob if she chooses to. As Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh have pointed
out [18], one can usefully develop an abstract black box model of quantum bit commitments
which incorporates the property of retractability: in this model, a retractable quantum bit
commitment corresponds to Alice giving Bob an ideal safe, containing a stored qubit, which
has the property that Alice can at any time either give Bob the power to open the safe or
repossess the safe herself and open it. This key insight pinpoints more precisely why secure
oblivious transfer cannot be built from RBC2 [18]. Yao’s construction [22] requires that, if
Bob chooses a suitable random subset of Alice’s commitments and finds that the unveiled
commitments correctly describe choices and outcomes of quantum measurements, he may
infer that the quantum measurements corresponding to the unopened commitments were
also implemented irreversibly. The retractability of unopened quantum bit commitments
invalidates this inference.
In summary, we have described a bit commitment protocol that is unconditionally secure
against parties equipped with arbitrarily powerful classical computers, something not previ-
ously believed to be possible. The protocol has the surprising and interesting feature that it
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implements deniable bit commitments. The result demonstrates that exploiting elementary
relativistic signalling constraints can be a surprisingly powerful tool in classical and quantum
cryptography. The protocol can be easily implemented with current technology. It would
be interesting to develop practical implementations and to examine further the potential for
useful applications.
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XI. APPENDIX: COMMENT ON TERMINOLOGY
The cryptographic literature on classical bit commitment includes various different illus-
trations of bit commitments based on computational or physical assumptions, which could
inspire subtly different definitions of bit commitment. This seems not to have worried classi-
cal cryptographers in the past. After all, the protocols all achieve the same essential result:
after some point, Alice is committed, and she can later unveil if she chooses. Singling out
one particular protocol as the unique earthly representative of the Platonic ideal of bit
commitment seems hard to justify.
However, the relation between quantum and classical cryptography involves new sub-
tleties, and the use of relativistic signalling constraints in cryptography may also do so,
so previously irrelevant distinctions perhaps need to be considered afresh. We have already
noted the distinction between secure quantum bit commitment and secure quantum bit com-
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mitment with a certificate of classicality. Another possible distinction that could be made
[16] deserves discussion here.
Some standard classical bit commitment schemes have the property that, once Alice is
committed, neither party need do anything further unless and until Alice chooses to unveil
the bit. Consider, for example, a classical bit commitment based on a suitable one-way
function, in which Alice commits to Bob the value f(x) of the function evaluated at some
x, which she chose randomly subject to the constraint that x has the same parity as the
committed bit. (Here “suitable” means that it is computationally hard to extract any
information about the parity of x from f(x).) In this protocol, commitment is complete
once Bob has received f(x), and Alice can unveil at any later time by sending x.
On the other hand, in RBC1 and RBC2 the Ai and Bi need to continue exchanging
transmissions indefinitely in order to sustain a secure commitment; they stop only if and
when Alice chooses to unveil the bit. If one particularly wished to make a point of stressing
this feature, one could propose new definitions distinguishing definite bit commitment and
sustained bit commitment, with one-way function commitments as examples of the former
and relativistic commitments as examples of the latter [16].
It seems to me, though, that there are two persuasive arguments against this nomen-
clature. The first is historical. Some well-known non-relativistic bit commitment schemes
also require one or both of the parties to actively maintain the commitment indefinitely.
For instance, in the simplest standard illustration of bit commitment based on physical as-
sumptions, Alice writes the bit on a piece of paper and puts it in a sealed envelope on a
table between her and Bob, in sight of them both. Alice is now committed, but in order
to maintain the security of the commitment each party now needs to watch the envelope to
ensure that the other does not interfere with it, and they must continue doing so indefinitely
unless and until Alice chooses to unveil. The original version of the BGKW protocol [2], in
which A2 is imprisoned in a Faraday cage monitored by Bob throughout the lifetime of the
commitment, has the same feature. To change terminology now would retroactively delegit-
imise these bit commitment protocols, relabelling them as protocols for the newly defined
cryptographic primitive of sustained bit commitment.
The second is a question of principle: one should not conflate the cryptographic task to
be implemented and the means of implementation. A cryptographic task can be defined
by the inputs and outputs into a black box version of the protocol. In the case of classical
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bit commitment, Alice inputs a bit to the box, and then later, if and when Alice inputs an
instruction to unveil, the bit is output to Bob. The details of how security is ensured or
maintained do not enter into this definition.
There are many different ways of implementing most cryptographic tasks, and setting out
the details of any given implementation has to date been considered as properly forming part
of the definition of a protocol, rather than part of a definition of the task. To abandon this
fundamental distinction now would requiring rewriting cryptological textbooks’ discussions
of many other primitives besides bit commitment. This would remove the clear and useful
distinction between task and protocol in current nomenclature, without which every different
protocol might be described as an instance of a different task. It seems to me far better not
to trespass onto this slippery slope.
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